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Epistemic	Modality,	Eavesdroppers	and	the	Objectivity	Problem	
Wylie	Breckenridge	
	
There	 is	 an	 account	 of	modal	 operators	 that	 is	 both	 elegant	 and	 powerful	 and	 that	
deserves	to	be	called	the	standard	account.	There	are,	however,	some	epistemic	uses	
of	modal	 operators	which	 seem	 to	 be	 counterexamples	 to	 the	 account	 –	 they	 pose	
what	I	call	the	objectivity	problem.	It	is	often	thought	that	the	objectivity	problem	can	
be	fixed	by	a	certain	kind	of	modification	to	the	standard	account.	I	argue	that	this	kind	
of	modification	 cannot	work.	 Then	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 problem	posed	 for	 the	 standard	
account	by	recently	discussed	eavesdropper	cases	is	really	just	the	objectivity	problem	
in	a	different	guise,	thereby	emphasizing	the	need	for	a	new	solution	to	the	objectivity	
problem.	Finally,	I	propose	a	new	solution	to	the	objectivity	problem.	
	
1.	The	standard	account	
	
According	 to	 what	 I	 shall	 call	 the	 standard	 account	 of	 possibility	 operators,	 an	
utterance	of	 ‘Possibly	S’	(and	its	variants	 ‘It	 is	possible	that	S’,	 ‘It	might	be	that	S’,	 ‘It	
can	be	that	S’,	etc.)	 in	a	context	C	is	true	if	and	only	if	the	prejacent	(the	proposition	
expressed	 by	 S	 in	 C)	 is	 compatible	 with	 the	 conversational	 background	 (a	 set	 of	
propositions	determined	by	C).1	If	we	analyze	compatibility	in	terms	of	worlds	then	we	
can	put	it	this	way:	the	utterance	is	true	iff	there	is	a	world	in	which	the	prejacent	and	
the	 propositions	 in	 the	 conversational	 background	 are	 all	 true.	 Different	 kinds	 of	
possibility	 correspond	 to	 different	 kinds	 of	 conversational	 background:	 if	 the	
conversational	background	is	a	body	of	knowledge	then	the	utterance	is	an	epistemic	
use	of	‘Possibly	S’;	if	it	is	a	set	of	laws	or	regulations	then	it	is	a	deontic	use;	if	it	is	a	set	
of	desires	then	it	is	a	bouletic	use;	and	so	on.	As	stated,	the	account	allows	that	when	
‘Possibly	 S’	 is	 used	 epistemically	 there	 is	 flexibility	 in	 whose	 knowledge	 forms	 the	
conversational	background	–	it	could	be	the	knowledge	of	the	speaker,	the	knowledge	
of	someone	other	than	the	speaker,	or	the	knowledge	of	some	group	of	people	which	
may	or	may	not	include	the	speaker.	
	
2.	The	objectivity	problem	
	
There	is	a	problem	for	the	standard	account	that	has	been	recognized	for	some	time.	
Here	is	an	old	and	well-known	example	due	to	Hacking	(1967,	p.	148):	
	
Salvage	ship	
Imagine	a	salvage	crew	searching	for	a	ship	that	sank	a	long	time	ago.	The	mate	
of	 the	 salvage	 ship	 works	 from	 an	 old	 log,	 makes	 some	 mistakes	 in	 his	
calculations,	and	concludes	that	the	wreck	may	be	in	a	certain	bay.	It	is	possible,	
he	says,	that	the	hulk	is	in	these	waters.	No	one	knows	anything	to	the	contrary.	
But	in	fact,	as	it	turns	out	later,	it	simply	was	not	possible	for	the	vessel	to	be	in	
that	bay;	more	careful	examination	of	 the	 log	 shows	 that	 the	boat	must	have	
gone	 down	 at	 least	 thirty	miles	 further	 south.	 The	mate	 said	 something	 false	
                                                
1		 See	Kratzer	(1977,	1981,	1991),	and	von	Fintel	(2006).	
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when	 he	 said,	 ‘It	 is	 possible	 that	 we	 shall	 find	 the	 treasure	 here,’	 but	 the	
falsehood	did	not	arise	from	what	anyone	actually	knew	at	the	time.	
	
The	problem	is	that	the	mate’s	utterance	of	‘It	is	possible	that	the	wreck	is	in	that	bay’	
is	false,	even	though	the	prejacent	(the	proposition	expressed	by	‘the	wreck	is	in	that	
bay’)	is	compatible	with	what	anyone	knows	at	the	time.	So	no	matter	which	body	of	
knowledge	we	take,	the	prejacent	is	compatible	with	that	body	of	knowledge,	and	the	
standard	account	wrongly	predicts	that	the	mate’s	utterance	is	true.	The	case	suggests	
that	 the	 truth	of	an	epistemic	utterance	of	 ‘Possibly	S’	can	depend	upon	 facts	about	
the	world	 that	are	not	known	 to	anyone	at	 the	 time,	 contrary	 to	what	 the	 standard	
account	predicts.	Call	this	the	objectivity	problem.	
	
Not	 everyone	 agrees	 that	 the	 mate’s	 utterance	 is	 false.	 They	 ask:	 “Why	 is	 it	 not	
epistemically	 possible	 that	 the	wreck	 is	 in	 that	 bay,	 given	 that	 it	 is	 compatible	with	
what	 anyone	 knows	 at	 the	 time	 that	 it	 is?	 Perhaps	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 in	 some	 other	
sense,	but	in	an	epistemic	sense	it	is.”	If	they	are	right	that	the	mate’s	utterance	is	not	
false	then	there	is	no	problem	here	for	the	standard	account.	But	many	people	agree	
that	 the	mate’s	utterance	 is	 false,	and	that	 there	 is	a	problem	here	 for	 the	standard	
account.	My	question	is:	if	so,	then	what	should	the	standard	account	do	about	it?	
	
3.	A	popular	fix	
	
One	 popular	 way	 of	 dealing	 with	 the	 objectivity	 problem	 is	 to	 allow	 that	 the	
conversational	 background	determined	by	 an	epistemic	utterance	of	 ‘Possibly	 S’	 can	
include	not	just	what	is	known	(by	some	person	or	group	of	persons)	but	also	what	can	
be	 known	 (what	 is	 within	 ‘epistemic	 reach’,	 as	 Egan	 (2007)	 would	 say).	 The	mate’s	
utterance	is	false,	not	because	the	prejacent	is	incompatible	with	what	is	known	at	the	
time,	but	because	it	is	incompatible	with	what	can	be	known	at	the	time	(that	the	log	
rules	out	the	wreck	being	in	that	bay).	Call	this	the	popular	fix.	
	
It	 is	 well	 known	 that	 the	 popular	 fix	 needs	 to	 place	 restrictions	 on	 what	 counts	 as	
knowable	 relative	 to	 an	 utterance	of	 ‘Possibly	 S’,	 or	 else	 there	 are	many	utterances	
that	it	wrongly	predicts	to	be	false.	Take	any	location	L	for	which	an	utterance	by	the	
mate	of	 ‘It	 is	possible	 that	 the	wreck	 is	at	 L’	 is	 true,	but	 the	wreck	 is	not	at	 L.	 If	we	
allow	that	it	can	be	known	that	the	wreck	is	not	at	L	(for	example,	by	diving	at	L	and	
looking),	then	it	is	not	compatible	with	what	can	be	known	that	the	wreck	is	at	L,	and	
so	the	utterance	is	wrongly	predicted	to	be	false.	So	to	get	the	right	result	the	popular	
fix	has	to	say	that	relative	to	this	utterance	it	cannot	be	known	that	the	wreck	is	at	L.	
Hacking	 (1967)	 proposes	 that	 only	 things	 that	 can	 be	 known	 by	 some	 practical	
investigation	 count	 as	 things	 that	 can	 be	 known	 (diving	 at	 L	 and	 looking	 is	 not	
practical);	 De	 Rose	 (1991)	 proposes	 that	 only	 things	 that	 can	 be	 known	 by	 some	
method	in	a	contextually	determined	set	of	relevant	methods	count	as	things	that	can	
be	known	(diving	at	L	and	looking	is	not	a	relevant	method).	
	
There	are	known	problems	for	each	of	these	two	ways	of	putting	restrictions	in	place	
(see	Egan	(2007),	von	Fintel	and	Gillies	(2008)).	But	I	have	more	serious	concerns	about	
the	general	approach	of	the	popular	fix.	
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4.	Concerns	about	the	popular	fix	
	
I	have	one	objection	and	two	challenges.	
	
First,	an	objection.	There	are	cases	in	which	the	unknown	fact	that	makes	an	utterance	
of	‘Possibly	S’	false	is	an	unknowable	fact,	so	appealing	to	what	can	be	known	to	solve	
the	objectivity	problem	is	bound	to	fail.2	Here	are	three	examples,	each	of	which	aims	
to	be	structurally	analogous	to	the	salvage	ship	case,	but	in	which	the	falsifying	fact	is	
unknowable:	
	
First	example.	Suppose	that	John	believes	that	Descartes	had	between	200	and	
400	 books	 on	 his	 bookshelf	 and	 is	 not	 open	 to	 it	 being	 otherwise.	 He	 is	
wondering	whether	it	was	between	200	and	300	or	between	300	and	400,	and	
asserts	‘It	might	have	been	between	200	and	300’.	If	in	fact	Descartes	had	only	
ten	 books	 on	 his	 bookshelf	 then	 John’s	 utterance	 is	 false.	 But	 the	 fact	 that	
Descartes	 had	 only	 ten	 books	 on	 his	 bookshelf	 is	 not	 something	 that	 John	 or	
anyone	else	can	know.	
	
Second	example.	Suppose	that	epistemicism	about	vagueness	is	right,	and	there	
can	be	people	who	are	not	thin	but	unknowably	not	thin.	Suppose	that	Mary	is	
unknowably	not	thin.	John	believes	that	Mary	is	thin	and	is	not	open	to	it	being	
otherwise.	He	is	wondering	whether,	of	all	the	thin	girls,	Mary	is	the	prettiest.	
He	 thinks	 that	 she	 stands	 a	 good	 chance	 and	 asserts	 ‘Mary	 might	 be	 the	
prettiest	 thin	girl’.	But	Mary	 is	not	even	 thin,	 so	 John’s	utterance	 is	 false,	and	
the	 fact	 that	Mary	 is	 not	 thin	 is	 not	 something	 that	 John	 or	 anyone	 else	 can	
know.	
	
Third	 example.	 Suppose	 that	 John	 thinks	 that	 it	 is	 not	 an	unknown	 truth	 that	
there	 is	 life	on	 Jupiter	and	 is	not	open	 to	 it	being	otherwise.	He	 is	wondering	
whether	 it	 is	 (a)	 false,	or	 (b)	 true	but	not	known.	He	asserts	 ‘It	might	be	 false	
that	there	is	life	on	Jupiter’.	If	in	fact	it	is	an	unknown	truth	that	there	is	life	on	
Jupiter	 then	 John’s	utterance	 is	 false.	But	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	an	unknown	truth	
that	there	is	life	on	Jupiter	is	not	something	than	John	or	anyone	else	can	know.	
	
Each	of	these	cases	has	the	same	structure	as	the	salvage	ship	case:	Someone	asserts	
‘Possibly	S’;	there	is	some	true	proposition	q	which	is	incompatible	with	the	prejacent	
p,	and	because	of	which	the	utterance	is	false;	but	q	is	not	something	that	anyone	at	
the	 time	 knows.	 According	 to	 the	 standard	 fix,	 the	 utterance	 is	 false	 because	 q	 is	
something	 that	 can	 be	 known	 (within	 certain	 restrictions).	 But	 the	 three	 examples	
above	show	that	 there	are	cases	 in	which	q	cannot	be	known,	so	that	no	amount	of	
tinkering	with	restrictions	will	get	the	standard	fix	to	work.	
	
That	is	my	objection	to	the	standard	account.	In	addition,	I	have	two	challenges.	
	
                                                
2	 Thanks	to	Stephen	Kearns.	
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First,	we	have	what	I	call	the	openness	observation.	When	the	truth	of	an	utterance	of	
‘Possibly	S’	depends	upon	facts	about	the	world	that	are	not	known	to	anyone	at	the	
time,	it	can	do	so	in	a	way	that	depends	upon	what	the	speaker	is	open	to	during	the	
utterance.	This	 is	a	 feature	of	all	 the	above	cases	 that	 I	haven’t	yet	emphasized,	but	
one	that	is	important.	On	the	most	natural	way	of	understanding	the	salvage	ship	case,	
the	mate	is	not	open	to	the	log’s	ruling	out	that	the	wreck	is	in	that	bay.	But	if	we	add	
to	 the	 story	 that	 he	 is	 (that	 he	 has	 some	doubts	 about	 his	 calculations),	 then	many	
now	judge	that	the	mate’s	utterance	 is	 true,	and	that	upon	re-examining	the	 log	the	
mate	would	 be	 right	 to	 stand	by	 his	 original	 claim	 and	 say,	 ‘It	 still	might	 have	 been	
there’.	Similarly,	in	the	examples	above,	if	John	were	open	to	Descartes	having	had	ten	
books	on	his	bookshelf	then	his	utterance	would	not	be	false,	if	he	were	open	to	Mary	
not	being	tall	then	his	utterance	would	not	be	false,	and	if	he	were	open	to	it	being	an	
unknown	truth	that	there	is	life	on	Jupiter	then	his	utterance	would	not	be	false.		
	
It	 seems	difficult	 for	 the	popular	 fix	 to	account	 for	 the	openness	observation.	 In	 the	
salvage	ship	case,	let	p	be	the	proposition	that	the	log	rules	out	the	wreck	being	in	that	
bay.	If	the	popular	fix	is	right	then	we	have	the	following	correlation:	if	the	mate	is	not	
open	to	p	then	p	can	be	known	(so	that	his	utterance	of	‘It	is	possible	that	the	wreck	is	
in	 that	 bay’	 is	 false);	 if	 the	mate	 is	 open	 to	 p	 then	 p	 cannot	 be	 known	 (so	 that	 his	
utterance	 of	 ‘It	 is	 possible	 that	 the	 wreck	 is	 in	 that	 bay’	 is	 true).	 Prima	 facie	 these	
correlations	are	the	wrong	way	around,	and	there	is	a	challenge	here	for	the	popular	
fix	to	explain	them.	
	
My	 second	challenge	 is	 this.	 The	 standard	account	 faces	 the	objectivity	problem	not	
just	with	epistemic	uses	of	 ‘Possibly	S’	but	with	non-epistemic	uses	as	well.	Here	are	
two	examples:	
	
Metaphysical	use	
John	 rolls	 a	 die	 and	 it	 comes	 up	 ‘3’.	 He	 asserts,	 ‘I	 might	 have	 rolled	 a	 ‘2’’	
(intending	 a	 metaphysical	 reading).	 There	 are	 worlds	 in	 which	 the	 prejacent	
(that	 John	 rolled	a	 ‘2’)	 and	 the	propositions	 in	 the	 conversational	background	
(the	 metaphysical	 laws)	 are	 all	 true,	 so	 on	 the	 standard	 account	 John’s	
utterance	is	true.	But	if	the	die	that	John	is	using	has	a	‘3’	on	all	sides	then	his	
utterance	 is	 false	 (assuming	 that	 John	 is	 not	 open	 to	 swapping	 his	 die	 for	 a	
regular	one	before	rolling	it	–	if	he	is	then	his	utterance	is	true).	
	
Deontic	use	
John	 is	 looking	 for	 a	 parking	 space	 in	 downtown	 Ithaca.	 The	 Ithaca	 council	
provides	special	parking	spaces	for	 fuel	efficient	cars.	Pointing	to	one	of	these	
spaces	John	asserts,	 ‘I	can	park	there’	 (intending	a	deontic	reading).	There	are	
worlds	 in	which	 the	prejacent	 (that	 John	parks	 there)	 and	 the	propositions	 in	
the	conversational	background	(the	parking	regulations)	are	all	true,	so	on	the	
standard	account	John’s	utterance	is	true.	But	if	John	is	driving	a	Hummer	then	
John’s	utterance	is	false	(assuming	that	John	is	not	open	to	swapping	his	car	for	
a	fuel	efficient	one	before	parking	–	if	he	is	then	his	utterance	is	true).		
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It	 is	not	clear	how	the	popular	fix	might	be	extended	to	these	cases.	The	natural	first	
try	is	as	follows:	in	the	metaphysical	case,	the	conversational	background	can	include	
not	 just	 things	 that	 are	metaphysical	 laws	 but	 also	 things	 that	 can	 be	metaphysical	
laws,	and	it	can	be	a	metaphysical	law	that	John	uses	a	die	with	a	‘3’	on	all	sides;	in	the	
deontic	 case,	 the	 conversational	 background	 can	 include	 not	 just	 things	 that	 are	
parking	 regulations	 but	 also	 things	 that	 can	 be	 parking	 regulations,	 and	 it	 can	 be	 a	
parking	 regulation	 that	 John	 drives	 a	 Hummer.	 This	 does	 not	 seem	 like	 a	 promising	
approach,	 so	 there	 is	 a	 challenge	 here	 for	 the	 present	 approach	 to	 come	up	with	 a	
more	promising	way	of	extending	to	other	kinds	of	possibility.	
	
Note	that	in	the	metaphysical	and	deontic	cases	just	given	we	also	have	the	openness	
observation	–	 that	 the	 truth	of	 an	utterance	of	 ‘Possibly	 S’	 can	depend	on	what	 the	
speaker	is	open	to	at	the	time	of	the	utterance.	What	we	would	like	is	a	solution	to	the	
objectivity	problem	and	an	explanation	of	the	openness	observation	that	extends	to	all	
kinds	of	possibility.	 I	 think	that	with	a	simple	and	well-motivated	modification	of	 the	
standard	account	we	can	get	just	that	(see	Section	6).	
	
But	before	that,	some	remarks	about	eavesdropper	cases.	
	
5.	Eavesdropper	cases	
	
There	has	recently	been	some	discussion	of	epistemic	uses	of	‘Possibly	S’	in	cases	that	
involve	eavesdroppers.	Here	is	simple	case	as	it	might	typically	be	described:	
	
Two	cups	
John	 is	 trying	 to	work	out	which	of	 two	cups	a	ball	 is	under.	He	asserts	 (with	
warrant),	‘The	ball	might	be	under	cup	1’.	In	fact	the	ball	 is	under	neither	cup.	
An	eavesdropper	who	knows	that	the	ball	is	under	neither	cup	judges	‘false’	of	
John’s	utterance.	Her	judgment	is	correct.	
	
Not	everyone	agrees	that	the	eavesdropper	is	correct	to	judge	‘false’,	but	assume	for	
the	moment	 that	 she	 is	 (I	will	 offer	 an	 explanation	of	 this	 below).	 The	 case	poses	 a	
problem	 for	 the	 standard	 account.	 According	 to	 the	 standard	 account,	 John’s	
utterance	is	false	just	in	case	it	is	not	compatible	with	the	conversational	background	
(a	body	of	knowledge)	that	the	ball	is	under	cup	1.	So	if	the	eavesdropper	is	correct	to	
judge	 ‘false’,	 then	 the	 conversational	 background	 cannot	 be	 merely	 John’s	 body	 of	
knowledge,	because	it	is	compatible	with	what	John	knows	that	the	ball	is	under	cup	1.	
If	the	conversational	background	includes	the	eavesdropper’s	body	of	knowledge	then	
we	get	 the	result	 that	 the	eavesdropper	 is	correct	 to	 judge	 ‘false’,	but	 then	we	have	
trouble	explaining	why	John	is	warranted	in	making	the	assertion	in	the	first	place	–	he	
has	no	idea	(we	can	add)	whether	or	not	he	has	an	eavesdropper,	or	how	much	such	
an	 eavesdropper	 might	 know,	 so	 if	 the	 truth	 of	 his	 utterance	 is	 sensitive	 to	 the	
knowledge	of	any	eavesdropper,	then	he	is	not	warranted	in	making	the	assertion.	Call	
this	the	eavesdropper	problem.	
	
In	response	to	the	eavesdropper	problem,	Egan	et.	al.	(2005),	Egan	(2007),	MacFarlane	
(2008),	and	others	have	defended	a	relativist	account	of	epistemic	uses	of	‘Possibly	S’.	
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According	to	this	account,	the	truth	of	an	epistemic	utterance	of	‘Possibly	S’	is	not	true	
or	 false	 simpliciter	 but	 only	 relative	 to	 an	 assessor	 and	 a	 time.	 In	 particular,	 an	
epistemic	utterance	of	 ‘Possibly	 S’	 in	 a	 context	C	 is	 true	 relative	 to	 an	assessor	A	 at	
time	t	iff	the	prejacent	is	compatible	with	everything	that	A	knows	at	t.	In	the	two	cups	
case,	John’s	utterance	is	true	relative	to	John	at	the	time	of	the	utterance	(since	 it	 is	
compatible	with	everything	that	John	knows	at	the	time	of	the	utterance	that	the	ball	
is	under	cup	1)	and	that	 is	why	John	 is	 justified	 in	making	the	assertion	 (perhaps	we	
need	to	add	that	John	knows	that	his	utterance	is	true	relative	to	him	at	the	time).	But	
relative	 to	 the	 eavesdropper	 at	 the	 time	 of	 her	 judgment	 John’s	 utterance	 is	 false	
(since	it	is	not	compatible	with	everything	that	the	eavesdropper	knows	at	the	time	of	
the	judgment	that	the	ball	is	under	cup	1),	and	that	is	why	the	eavesdropper	is	correct	
to	 judge	 ‘false’	 (i.e.	 false	 relative	 to	 her	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 judgment).	 The	 relativist	
account	thus	allows	that	John	is	 justified	 in	asserting	‘The	ball	might	be	under	cup	1’	
and	that	the	eavesdropper	is	correct	to	judge	‘false’.	
	
Rejecting	 the	 relativist	 account,	 von	 Fintel	 and	Gillies’s	 (2008)	 propose	 that	 coupled	
with	 a	 sufficiently	 enriched	 pragmatic	 theory	 the	 standard	 account	 can	 handle	
eavesdropper	cases.3	According	to	the	standard	account,	an	epistemic	use	of	‘Possibly	
S’	 determines	 a	 certain	 body	of	 knowledge	 as	 the	 conversational	 background,	 but	 it	
does	not	make	explicit	exactly	which	body	of	knowledge	this	is,	and	this	can	give	rise	to	
an	interpretational	ambiguity.	von	Fintel	and	Gillies	propose	that	sometimes	speakers	
exploit	 this	ambiguity,	and	would	say	 that	 this	 is	what	 John	 is	doing	 in	 the	 two	cups	
case.	 By	 uttering	 ‘The	 ball	 might	 be	 under	 cup	 1’,	 John	 puts	 into	 play	 at	 least	 two	
propositions,	 one	 being	 a	 solipsistic	 reading	 of	 ‘The	 ball	 might	 be	 under	 cup	 1’	 (on	
which	the	conversational	background	is	everything	that	John	knows),	the	other	being	a	
group	 reading	 (on	which	 the	 conversational	 background	 is	 everything	 that	 John	 and	
the	eavesdropper	together	know).	John	is	warranted	in	making	the	utterance	because	
he	is	warranted	in	asserting	at	least	one	of	these	two	propositions	(the	solipsistic	one).	
The	 eavesdropper	 is	 pragmatically	 obliged	 to	 react	 to	 the	 strongest	 proposition	 she	
reasonably	has	an	opinion	about,	which	is	the	group	reading.	Since	the	group	reading	
is	false,	the	eavesdropper	is	correct	to	judge	‘false’.	This	ambiguity	by	design	account	
thus	allows	that	John	is	justified	in	asserting	‘The	ball	might	be	under	cup	1’	and	that	
the	eavesdropper	is	correct	to	judge	‘false’.	
	
The	relativist	and	ambiguity	by	design	accounts	both	assume	a	certain	explanation	for	
why	the	eavesdropper	is	correct	to	judge	‘false’:	she	is	correct	to	judge	‘false’,	because	
when	 she	 assesses	 John’s	 utterance	 her	 body	 of	 knowledge	 is	 to	 be	 included	 in	 the	
conversational	 background	 of	 the	 utterance,	 and	 her	 body	 of	 knowledge	 is	
incompatible	 with	 the	 prejacent	 of	 the	 utterance	 (had	 it	 been	 compatible	 with	 the	
prejacent	then	her	judgment	would	not	have	been	correct).	
	
But	is	this	the	right	explanation?	Here	is	an	alternative:	the	eavesdropper	is	correct	to	
judge	 ‘false’	 because	 John’s	 utterance	 is	 false,	 and	 John’s	 utterance	 is	 false	 because	
the	 ball	 is	 under	 neither	 cup,	 something	 that	 John	was	 not	 open	 at	 the	 time	of	 the	
utterance.	In	short,	this	is	just	another	instance	of	the	objectivity	problem.	Whether	or	
not	the	eavesdropper	is	correct	to	judge	‘false’	does	not	depend	on	what	she	knows.	
                                                
3		 Against	the	relativist	account	also	see	Hawthorne	(2007)	and	Wright	(2007).	
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Whether	or	not	 she	 is	warranted	 to	 judge	 ‘false’	might	depend	on	what	 she	 knows,	
and	perhaps	she	judges	‘false’	because	of	what	she	knows,	but	whether	or	not	she	is	
correct	to	judge	‘false’	does	not	depend	on	what	she	knows.	
	
Which	is	the	better	of	these	two	explanations?	Here	are	some	reasons	to	think	that	it	
is	the	latter.	
	
First,	consider	a	modified	case	in	which	the	eavesdropper	is	ignorant	of	where	the	ball	
is,	and	judges	‘false’	just	as	a	guess.	In	this	case	her	judgment	is	still	correct:	
	
Two	cups	(ignorant	eavesdropper)	
John	is	trying	to	work	out	which	of	two	cups	the	ball	is	under.	He	asserts,	‘The	
ball	 might	 be	 under	 cup	 1’.	 In	 fact	 the	 ball	 is	 under	 neither.	 An	 ignorant	
eavesdropper	guesses	‘false’	of	John’s	utterance.	Her	guess	is	correct.	
	
According	 to	 the	 first	 explanation	 the	 eavesdropper’s	 judgment	 is	 not	 correct	 –	 her	
body	of	knowledge	is	compatible	with	the	ball	being	under	cup	1,	so	she	is	not	correct	
to	judge	‘false’.	According	to	the	second	explanation	her	judgment	is	correct	–	it	is	still	
the	case	that	the	ball	in	under	neither	cup,	something	that	John	is	not	open	to.	So	the	
second	explanation	fares	better.	
	
Second,	 consider	 a	 modified	 case	 in	 which	 the	 ball	 is	 under	 cup	 2,	 and	 the	
eavesdropper	 knows	 that	 the	 ball	 is	 under	 cup	 2.	 In	 this	 case	 her	 judgment	 is	 not	
correct:	
	
Two	cups	(cup	2)	
John	is	trying	to	work	out	which	of	two	cups	the	ball	is	under.	He	asserts,	‘The	
ball	might	be	under	cup	1’.	In	fact	the	ball	is	under	cup	2.	An	eavesdropper	who	
knows	 that	 the	 ball	 is	 under	 cup	 2	 judges	 ‘false’	 of	 John’s	 utterance.	 Her	
judgment	is	not	correct.	
	
According	to	the	first	explanation	the	eavesdropper’s	judgment	is	correct	–	her	body	of	
knowledge	is	 incompatible	with	the	ball	being	under	cup	1,	so	she	is	correct	to	judge	
‘false’.	According	 to	 the	second	explanation	her	 judgment	 is	not	correct	–	 the	ball	 is	
under	cup	2,	something	that	John	is	open	to.	So	the	second	explanation	fares	better.	
	
Third,	consider	a	modified	case	in	which	John	is	open	to	the	ball	being	under	neither	
cup.	In	this	case,	again,	the	eavesdropper’s	judgment	of	‘false’	is	not	correct:	
	
Two	cups	(open-minded)	
John	is	trying	to	work	out	which,	if	any,	of	two	cups	the	ball	is	under	(he	is	open	
to	 it	being	under	neither	 cup).	He	asserts,	 ‘The	ball	might	be	under	 cup	1’.	 In	
fact	the	ball	is	under	neither.	An	eavesdropper	who	knows	that	the	ball	is	under	
neither	judges	‘false’	of	John’s	utterance.	Her	judgment	is	not	correct.	
	
According	to	the	first	explanation	the	eavesdropper’s	judgment	is	correct	–	her	body	of	
knowledge	 is	 incompatible	with	 the	ball	being	under	cup	1.	According	 to	 the	second	
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explanation	her	judgment	is	not	correct	–	the	ball	is	under	neither	cup,	something	that	
John	is	open	to.	So	the	second	explanation	fares	better.	
	
I	propose,	then,	that	the	second	explanation	is	the	correct	explanation	for	why,	in	the	
original	 two	cups	 case,	 the	eavesdropper	 is	 correct	 to	 judge	 ‘false’.	 She	 is	 correct	 to	
judge	 ‘false’	 because	 John’s	 utterance	 is	 false,	 and	 John’s	 utterance	 is	 false	 for	 the	
same	kind	of	reason	that	the	mate’s	utterance	is	false	in	the	two	ships	case.	Explaining	
why	those	utterances	are	false	is	the	objectivity	problem,	and	this	is	indeed	a	problem	
for	the	standard	account.	But	the	two	cups	case	poses	no	new	problem	to	do	with	the	
presence	 of	 eavesdroppers.	 So	 too,	 I	 propose,	 for	 all	 of	 the	 other	 cases	 involving	
eavesdroppers	that	have	recently	been	discussed	(although	I	won’t	justify	that	here).	
	
All	the	more	reason,	then,	to	figure	out	a	way	to	solve	the	objectivity	problem.	
	
6.	A	proposal	
	
I	will	now	propose	a	modification	of	the	standard	account	that	promises	to	solve	the	
objectivity	problem	and	explain	the	openness	observation,	and	extends	to	all	kinds	of	
possibility.	
	
It	will	help	to	consider	the	metaphysical	case	first.	About	this	case	it	seems	natural	to	
say	this:	if	the	die	that	John	used	had	a	‘3’	on	each	side,	then	whether	or	not	it	is	true	
that	John	might	have	rolled	a	‘2’	depends	on	whether	or	not	we	can	consider	worlds	in	
which	John	first	swaps	the	die	for	one	that	has	a	‘2’	on	it:	if	we	can	then	it	is	true;	if	we	
cannot	then	it	is	false.	Might	John	have	rolled	a	‘2’?	Not	if	he	was	stuck	to	using	the	die	
with	a	‘3’	on	all	sides.	But	yes	if	he	was	allowed	to	first	swap	it	for	a	regular	die.	We	can	
think	of	this	in	terms	of	closeness:	whether	or	not	it	is	true	that	John	might	have	rolled	
a	‘2’	depends	on	how	close	to	the	actual	world	are	the	worlds	that	we	can	consider:	if	
they	can	be	sufficiently	far	away	then	it	is	true;	otherwise	it	is	false.	
	
We	seem	to	have	an	intuitive	notion	of	closeness	between	worlds.	Suppose	John	rolls	a	
die	with	 a	 ‘3’	 on	 all	 sides,	 and	 that	 he	 rolls	 a	 particular	 ‘3’.	 He	might	 have	 rolled	 a	
different	‘3’	with	the	same	die,	so	there	is	a	counterfactual	world	in	which	John	rolls	a	
different	 ‘3’	with	the	same	die.	He	also	might	have	rolled	a	 ‘2’,	by	first	swapping	the	
die	for	a	regular	one	and	then	rolling	a	‘2’,	so	there	is	a	counterfactual	world	in	which	
John	rolls	a	‘2’	with	a	regular	die.	The	first	of	these	counterfactual	worlds	is	closer	to	
the	 actual	world	 than	 the	 second	 is	 –	 the	 second	 requires	 a	 greater	 deviation	 from	
actuality	than	the	first.	Presumably	it	 is	this	notion	of	closeness	to	which	David	Lewis	
(1973,	1986	pp.	20-7)	appeals	when	giving	his	account	of	counterfactual	conditionals:	
‘If	 it	 had	 snowed	 today	 then	 I	 would	 have	 gone	 skiing’	 expresses	 (in	 my	 mouth)	 a	
proposition	that	 is	true	 iff	every	closest	world	 in	which	 it	snowed	today	 is	a	world	 in	
which	I	went	skiing.	As	for	‘might’	counterfactuals:	‘If	it	had	snowed	today	then	I	might	
have	gone	skiing’	expresses	 (in	my	mouth)	a	proposition	 that	 is	 true	 iff	 some	closest	
world	in	which	it	snowed	today	is	a	world	in	which	I	went	skiing.	If	the	truth	or	falsity	
of	 our	 utterances	 of	 ‘If	 it	 were	 the	 case	 that	 A	 then	 it	might	 be	 the	 case	 that	 S’	 is	
sensitive	 to	 the	 closeness	of	worlds,	 then	 it	would	not	be	 surprising	 to	 find	 that	 the	
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truth	or	falsity	of	our	utterances	of	 ‘It	might	the	case	that	S’	 (and	‘Possibly	S’)	 is	also	
sensitive	to	the	closeness	of	worlds.	
	
With	this	 in	mind,	 I	propose	the	following	modification	of	 the	standard	account	 (it	 is	
the	original	standard	account	with	an	addition,	shown	in	italics):	
	
Modified	standard	account	
An	utterance	of	‘Possibly	S’	in	a	context	C	is	true	if	and	only	if	there	is	a	world	
within	d	of	the	actual	world	(where	d	is	determined	by	C)	in	which	the	prejacent	
and	the	propositions	in	the	conversational	background	are	all	true.	
	
The	idea	is	that	the	context	of	utterance	determines	some	distance	between	worlds,	d.	
Exactly	which	 distance	 this	 is	 depends,	 in	 part,	 upon	what	 the	 speaker	 is	 open	 to	 –	
roughly,	the	more	the	speaker	is	open	to	the	greater	the	distance	she	is	allowing	that	
the	actual	world	is	from	the	closest	prejacent	world	and	the	bigger	the	value	of	d;	the	
less	the	speaker	is	open	to	the	less	the	distance	she	is	allowing	that	the	actual	world	is	
from	the	closest	prejacent	world	and	the	smaller	the	value	of	d.	With	a	distance	d	thus	
determined,	whether	or	not	the	utterance	of	‘Possibly	S’	is	true	depends	not	simply	on	
whether	 there	 is	 a	 world	 in	 which	 the	 prejacent	 and	 the	 propositions	 in	 the	
conversational	background	are	all	true,	but	on	whether	there	is	such	a	world	within	d	
of	 the	 actual	 world.	 Thus	 apart	 from	 the	 compatibility	 of	 the	 prejacent	 and	 the	
conversational	background,	it	also	depends	upon	which	world	is	actual.	This	is	why	the	
truth	of	an	utterance	of	 ‘Possibly	S’	can	depend	upon	facts	about	the	world	that	are	
not	known	to	anyone,	and	in	a	way	that	depends	upon	what	the	speaker	is	open	to.	
	
How	does	the	modified	account	handle	the	salvage	ship	case?	When	the	mate	asserts,	
‘It	is	possible	that	the	wreck	is	in	that	bay’,	there	is	some	d	such	that	his	utterance	is	
true	iff	there	is	a	world	within	d	of	the	actual	world	in	which	the	wreck	is	in	that	bay	
and	everything	that	he	knows	in	the	actual	world	is	true.	The	mate	thinks	that	the	log	
does	not	rule	out	the	wreck	being	 in	that	bay,	and	is	not	open	to	 it	being	otherwise.	
Because	of	this	d	is	small	enough	that	if	the	log	does	rule	out	the	wreck	being	in	that	
bay	then	there	are	no	worlds	within	d	of	the	actual	world	in	which	the	wreck	is	in	that	
bay.	 Since	 the	 log	 does	 rule	 out	 the	 wreck	 being	 in	 that	 bay	 (as	 the	 mate	 later	
discovers),	 there	are	no	worlds	within	d	of	 the	actual	world	 in	which	 the	wreck	 is	 in	
that	bay,	and	so	the	mate’s	utterance	is	false.	
	
How	 does	 the	modified	 account	 handle	 the	 two	 cups	 case	 (original	 version)?	When	
John	asserts,	‘The	ball	might	be	under	cup	1’,	there	is	some	d	such	that	his	utterance	is	
true	iff	there	is	a	world	within	d	of	the	actual	world	in	which	the	ball	is	under	cup	1	and	
everything	 that	 he	 knows	 in	 the	 actual	 world	 is	 true.	 If	 John	 thinks	 that	 the	 ball	 is	
under	one	of	the	two	cups,	and	is	not	open	to	it	being	otherwise,	then	John	thinks	that	
the	actual	world	is	fairly	close	to	a	world	in	which	the	ball	is	under	cup	1,	and	because	
of	this	d	is	small	enough	that	if	the	ball	is	actually	under	neither	cup	then	there	are	no	
worlds	within	d	of	the	actual	world	 in	which	the	ball	 is	under	cup	1.	Since	the	ball	 is	
actually	under	neither	cup,	there	are	no	worlds	within	d	of	the	actual	world	in	which	
the	ball	 is	under	cup	1,	and	John’s	utterance	is	false.	If	John	is	open	to	the	ball	being	
under	neither	cup,	then	d	is	large	enough	that	even	if	the	ball	is	actually	under	neither	
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cup	there	are	worlds	within	d	of	the	actual	world	in	which	the	ball	is	under	cup	1.	Since	
the	ball	is	actually	under	neither	cup,	there	are	worlds	within	d	of	the	actual	world	in	
which	 the	 ball	 is	 under	 cup	 1,	 and	 since	 there	 are	 some	 such	 worlds	 in	 which	
everything	John	knows	in	the	actual	world	is	true,	John’s	utterance	is	true.	We	can	thus	
see	how	the	truth	of	John’s	utterance	depends	(a)	on	facts	about	how	the	world	is	that	
need	 not	 be	 known	 to	 anyone	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 utterance,	 and	 (b)	 in	 a	 way	 that	
depends	on	what	John	is	open	to:	the	latter	effects	the	value	of	d,	and	thus	how	close	
to	 the	 actual	world	 there	 needs	 to	 be	 a	world	 in	which	 the	ball	 is	 under	 cup	 1;	 the	
former	effects	whether	or	not	there	is	such	a	world.	
	
The	explanation	of	each	case	takes	the	same	general	form:	Someone	asserts	‘Possibly	
S’;	there	 is	some	d	such	that	the	utterance	is	true	 iff	there	 is	a	world	within	d	of	the	
actual	 world	 in	 which	 the	 prejacent	 p	 and	 the	 propositions	 in	 the	 conversational	
background	B	 are	 all	 true;	 the	 speaker	 believes	 that	 q	 is	 true,	 and	 is	 not	 open	 to	 it	
being	false,	and	because	of	this	d	is	small	enough	that	if	q	is	actually	false	then	there	
are	no	worlds	within	d	of	the	actual	world	in	which	p	is	true;	as	it	turns	out,	q	actually	
is	false,	so	there	are	no	worlds	within	d	of	the	actual	world	in	which	p	is	true,	so	there	
are	no	worlds	within	d	of	the	actual	world	in	which	p	and	the	propositions	in	B	are	all	
true,	 so	 the	utterance	 is	 false;	had	 the	 speaker	been	open	 to	q	being	 false	 then	 the	
utterance	 would	 have	 determined	 some	 bigger	 distance	 d+,	 big	 enough	 that	 the	
utterance	would	then	have	been	true.	In	the	salvage	ship	case,	S	is	the	sentence	‘The	
wreck	is	in	that	bay’	and	q	is	the	proposition	that	the	log	does	not	rule	out	the	wreck	
being	in	that	bay;	in	the	two	cups	case,	S	is	the	sentence	‘The	ball	is	under	cup	1’	and	q	
is	 the	 proposition	 that	 the	 ball	 is	 under	 cup	 1	 or	 cup	 2.	 Nothing	 in	 the	 explanation	
assumes	 that	 the	 utterance	 is	 an	 epistemic	 use	 of	 ‘Possibly	 S’	 –	 the	 same	 form	 of	
explanation	can	be	used	for	the	metaphysical	and	deontic	cases	above.	
	
Thus	with	a	 simple	and	well-motivated	modification	of	 the	 standard	account	we	can	
solve	 the	 objectivity	 problem	 and	 explain	 the	 openness	 observation	 in	 a	 way	 that	
extends	naturally	to	all	kinds	of	possibility.4	
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